Knowing China, Losing China: Discourse and Power in U.S.-China Relations by Narayanan, Shankara
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Honors Scholar Theses Honors Scholar Program 
Spring 5-5-2021 




Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/srhonors_theses 
 Part of the Asian History Commons, Asian Studies Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, 
International Relations Commons, Political History Commons, and the United States History Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Narayanan, Shankara, "Knowing China, Losing China: Discourse and Power in U.S.-China Relations" 
(2021). Honors Scholar Theses. 819. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/srhonors_theses/819 
Knowing China, Losing China: Discourse and Power in U.S.-China Relations 
 
Abstract: 
The U.S. government’s 2017 National Security Strategy claimed, “China and Russia challenge 
American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and 
prosperity.”1 Three years later, the COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated the U.S. foreign policy 
community’s discursive shift towards Realist competition with China, with officials from the 
past three presidential administrations coming to view China as a threat to democratic 
governance and America’s security posture in Asia. The discourse underpinning the U.S.-China 
relationship, however, remains understudied. During key moments in the relationship, U.S. 
policymakers’ Realist intellectual frameworks failed to account for Chinese nationalism, 
suggesting a problem embedded within America’s strategic discourse. This manuscript uses 
discourse analysis to analyze why and how American officials failed to create a strong, united, 
and democratic China during the Marshall Mission (1945-1947). The use of Realist constructs, 
great-power frameworks, and theories of geopolitical realism prevented U.S. officials from 
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In 2011, President Barack Obama announced an American “Pivot to Asia”, triggering 
widespread speculation that the Pivot was designed to check China’s rise in the Asia-Pacific, 
despite its emphasis on diplomatically engaging countries across Northeast, Southeast and South 
Asia (Green, 2016). Over the following years, the U.S. Navy deployed more ships to the region, 
patrolling sea lanes, islands and ports as part of its buildup (Reuters, 2012). When Xi Jinping 
was elected President of China in 2013, and began nationalist calls for the “rejuvenation” of 
China to fulfill a “Chinese Dream”, American, Asian and European policymaking communities 
feared it heralded escalating military competition between the U.S. and China in the Pacific 
Ocean (BBC, 2013). These fears grew as the Chinese Navy began to expand its presence in the 
South China Sea, as President Xi announced his Belt and Road Initiative, and as the U.S. and 
China entered into a trade war in 2017. Indeed, in 2019, Henry Kissinger proclaimed that the 
U.S. and China were in the “foothills of a Cold War.” (Bloomberg News, 2019). On March 3, 
2021 current Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated that, “Our relationship with China will 
be competitive when it should be, collaborative when it can be, adversarial when it must be” 
(Blinken, 2021).   
In an effort to analyze the potential shortcomings of the growing shift in popular 
consensus towards political-military competition with President Xi’s nationalist China, this 
manuscript uses discourse analysis to analyze prior instances where American policy failed 
because of a basic misunderstanding of Chinese nationalism. How has U.S. discourse previously 
failed to account for China’s nationalism? To answer this question, this paper analyzes the 
evolution of U.S. policy discourse during the build-up and collapse of the Marshall Mission 
(1945-1947), from Imperial Japan’s surrender on August 15, 1945, to the Mission’s effective 
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end-date during the Manchurian Crisis (May 4, 1946). From 1945-1947, President Truman sent 
General George Marshall to China to broker a peace deal between Mao Zedong’s Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and Chiang-Kai Shek’s Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT), 
hoping to form a postwar unity government. The negotiations failed, and China’s Civil War 
began, eventually delivering victory for Mao’s CCP. This paper uses discourse analysis to 
examine how the Realist spectrum of the Truman Administration’s thinking about China 
precluded an accurate understanding of nationalism in Maoist thought. It demonstrates how U.S.-
China discourses can construct political realities which lead to inaccurate, misjudged foreign 
policies. This paper argues that the Truman Administration’s embrace of great-power politics, 
Realist theories of international relations, and geopolitical realism elided the postcolonial 
nationalism of Mao Zedong from U.S. discourse, placing the U.S. and the CCP on the glide path 
to confrontation which erupted during the Manchurian Crisis. It demonstrates that nationalist 
ideologies can confound Realist expectations of international politics. With President Xi 
embracing Chinese nationalism today while U.S. officials embrace Realist policies in Asia, this 
paper highlights the gap between American thinking and China’s behavior. 
Up until 2020, the spectrum of debate over the best strategy for the U.S. to adopt allowed 
room for arguments including coexistence and diplomatic engagement with China, as well as for 
arguments embracing military competition. In 2005, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick 
called for China to be a, “responsible stakeholder” of world order, promoting a U.S. policy of 
engaging China (Zoellick, 2005). Key architects of the Pivot such as President Obama’s 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Kurt Campbell (2019), and Former 
National Security Advisor to Vice-President Biden, Jake Sullivan (2019), advocated for a policy 
of engaging President Xi on issues of common global concern, such as climate change, pandemic 
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spread, nuclear proliferation, and counterterrorism while maintaining military deterrence 
capabilities in the Pacific. Fareed Zakaria (2019) coined this approach “engagement plus”. By 
contrast, scholars within the U.S. military’s colleges argue for stronger military competition with 
China, citing its provocative behavior. Naval War College Professor Toshi Yoshihara (2012) 
argued that the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) pursuit of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s geopolitical 
theories, and the PLA’s employment of asymmetric, anti-access and area-denial defense 
strategies are proof that China seeks to prevent the U.S. Navy from conducting military 
operations in the East and South China Seas.  
The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated tensions between the U.S. and China, ushering 
in a discursive shift within the U.S. policymaking community towards Realist great-power 
competition and away from “engagement plus”. The new consensus identifies China as a 
political enemy, signaling that both countries see each other as irreconcilable with their 
respective interests in the Asia-Pacific. Crucially, the shift is bipartisan, and happened at the start 
of the U.S. COVID-19 outbreak. Now President Biden’s Indo-Pacific Coordinator, Kurt 
Campbell (2020) claimed in March of 2020 that, “As Washington falters…[Beijing] is working 
to tout its own system, provide material assistance to other countries, and even organize other 
governments.” Similarly, President Trump’s Deputy National Security Advisor Nadia Schadlow 
(2020) wrote that, “at some point, an American administration needed to shift the conversation 
away from hopes for an imagined future China to the realities of the Communist Party’s 
conduct.” From the Bush Administration, former National Security Council Director for Asia, 
Evan Medeiros, and former Special Assistant to the President Michael Green, argued that Beijing 
has seen an opportunity to undercut the U.S., “…launching an international campaign stressing 
the failures of democratic governance and casting itself as the leader of the global pandemic 
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response.” (Green & Medeiros, 2020). Collectively, these officials represent key Asia 
policymakers from the past three presidential administrations. Each now argues that China is a 
political-ideological threat to the U.S., which must be checked through security competition. In 
one year, U.S. policy towards China has pivoted dramatically towards major-power 
confrontation. Is American Realist discourse accurate in its appraisal of Chinese strategy, 
intentions, thinking or behavior? Does it fully take into account the CCP’s nationalism? 
 The question of how Realism’s discursive shortcomings may have been responsible for 
U.S. policy failures in the Marshall Mission (1945-1947) remains understudied in international 
relations literature, despite its critical importance. Introspection is necessary because of the shift 
in American strategic discourse towards Realist precepts regarding China today. International 
relations literature on U.S. policy towards China coalesces around three disciplines: International 
Relations Theory, Regional Security Studies, and Diplomatic History. Surprisingly, each 
discipline lacks critical examinations of American foreign policy’s failures in its encounters with 
Chinese nationalism, specifically during the Marshall Mission (December 1945-January 1947).   
International Relations Theory and China’s Rise: 
 Liberal and Realist theories of international relations establish divergent expectations of 
international politics. The Realist discourse of U.S. policymakers during the Marshall Mission 
makes this theoretical divergence relevant to historical policy failures in U.S.-China relations. 
Furthermore, the assumptions of Liberalism and Realism have been reflected in 21st century 
debates over an appropriate American foreign policy vis-à-vis China’s rise.  
Liberal theories of international relations argue that global institutions, integrated 
economies and multilateral frameworks can shape nations’ behavior and enable cooperation 
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(Keohane & Nye 1977). While Liberalism is comprised of multiple theories, two are most 
relevant to this manuscript: Institutional Liberalism, and Liberal Internationalism. Michael Doyle 
and Robert Keohane have outlined Liberalism in these contexts extensively. Doyle (1983) 
claimed that Liberalism is tied to the freedom of individuals, with the belief in “moral freedom” 
generating global rights and institutions. Keohane (2012, p.126-127) argues that Institutional 
Liberalism reflects a basically Madisonian worldview, where institutions are the key to 
expressing, “pluralist conceptions of power and interests”, and to protecting against, “the 
consequences of unchecked power”. Keohane (2012, p.126) establishes that the legitimacy of 
constructing such institutions lies in their ability to enhance cooperation in world politics, by 
promoting, “beneficial effects on human security, human welfare and human liberty as a result of 
a more peaceful, prosperous and free world.” Globally, institutions can be facilitative of state 
cooperation while taming state power.  
Doyle (1986) links Liberalism and Liberal Internationalism to philosophers such as 
Immanuel Kant. Kant’s Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch established the foundation of 
Democratic Peace Theory, the pursuit of which can manifest as Liberal Internationalism. Kant 
maintained that a foedus pacificum (league of peace) could “make an end” of war if it expanded 
to include more and more democratic states (Doyle, 1986, p.1158). For Doyle (1986), democratic 
peace, therefore, is the belief that amongst liberal states there exists a “separate peace”, and an 
aversion to aggression against one another. James Ray (2001) and Spencer Weart (1998) have 
echoed such arguments.  
In the context of U.S.-China relations, Liberal scholars such as G. John Ikenberry 
believed China would be integrated into the existing world order of multilateral institutions, 
eventually promoting domestic market reforms and political reforms, thereby taming the 
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Communist Party’s rule (Ikenberry, 2008). Institutions, for Ikenberry, could create a peacefully 
rising China. Robert Zoellick (2005) hoped that China could be a “responsible stakeholder”, 
representing the Institutional Liberal view that if enmeshed in global multilateral architectures, 
China’s foreign policy would be directed towards upholding the broader liberal order they 
flowed from. Left out of Ikenberry’s and Zoellick’s arguments was an examination of how 
Liberal trajectories may experience pushback from the nationalist CCP.  
Realism, by contrast, focuses on states’ pursuit of power and takes a fatalistic view of 
international politics, born out of the interwar years and World War II. Edward Hallett Carr, 
Hans Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz were the architects of Realist scholarship in the 20th 
century. Realists traditionally argue that power-politics and security competition are an 
inevitable outcome of world politics (Carr, 2001; Morgenthau & Thompson 2005; Waltz, 1959). 
Rather than taming power or facilitating cooperation, Carr (2001, p.10) states that Realism, 
“tends to emphasize the irresistible strength of existing forces and the inevitable character of 
existing tendencies, and to insist that the highest wisdom lies in…adapting oneself to…these 
tendencies.” Classical Realists such as Morgenthau (2005) emphasize states’ universal “tendency 
to dominate”. Realism also focuses on major-powers. For Morgenthau (2005, p.35), “The 
aspiration for power being the distinguishing element of international politics…international 
politics is of necessity power politics.” According to Mearsheimer (2014), Structural Realism as 
expressed by Kenneth Waltz simply holds that states compete for power because of an 
unstable—or anarchic—world; state aggression is not intrinsic, but a reflection of external 
conditions.  
Realist scholars of U.S.-China relations argued that escalating security competition 
between the U.S. and China was likely, and that China would seek to end U.S. hegemony in Asia 
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as it rose to great-power status (Allison, 2017; Mearsheimer, 2014). John Mearsheimer’s theory 
of Offensive Realism claimed nations believe security is best achieved through power 
maximization in the international system (Mearsheimer, 2014). This theory predicts a major-
power war with the U.S. as a byproduct of China’s rise, and its consequently expanding security 
interests (Mearsheimer, 2014). Mearsheimer acknowledges that nationalism can expand nations’ 
security interests, but does not critically examine how established great-powers interact with 
rising-power nationalism, or with nationalism more broadly. To develop the analytical strength 
of Realism in U.S.-China relations, recent research applied the phenomenon known as 
“Thucydides’ Trap” to China’s rise (Allison, 2017). In Thucydides’ Trap, rising-powers come 
into conflict with established great-powers as a result of competing interests and the great-
power’s fear of the rising-power (Allison, 2017).  
Implicit in this intellectual universe is the idea that great-power tensions arise as rising-
powers pursue new security strategies. Yoshihara and Holmes (2018) argue that structural, 
socioeconomic forces are “impelling” China to the Pacific, where it seeks to secure its economic 
and political interests. This manuscript shows that the CCP’s nationalist ideology lent itself to 
long-term security goals in Asian waters from at least 1937. The CCP, then, represents a more 
intractable regime-type than that suggested by Realist interpretations of international relations. 
At the theoretical level, the Truman Administration’s reliance on Realism in crafting its China 
policy acts as a useful case study in Realism’s tension with nationalism. 
Despite the research conducted by international relations theorists into the future 
trajectory of China’s rise and the implications for U.S. hegemony in Asia, the field has not 
explored prior failures in the U.S.-China relationship in detail. As COVID-19 worsens U.S.-
8 
 
China military competition today, Realist assumptions have come to act as the intellectual 
touchstone of regional security studies. 
Regional Security Studies in the United States: 
 The field of Asian regional security studies seeks to shape future competition between the 
U.S. and China by providing policy analysis, but it lacks a comprehensive analysis of how the 
constructs it utilizes may fail to capture the nature of Chinese nationalism. As a result, its 
intellectual underpinnings may exhibit similar parallels to the Marshall Mission’s inability to 
accurately describe Chinese behavior. The discipline is distinct in its reach: universities, think-
tanks, the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Intelligence Community, and 
military colleges and universities all contribute to ongoing research. As a result, this field’s 
ability to shape ongoing policy debates is significant. The fact that it crystallizes around 
epistemological constructs similar to Liberal and Realist theories of international relations 
demonstrates the impact of theory-based discursive spectrums on policy analysis, and therefore 
on policy formulation. 
Starting in 2007, when the PLA undertook its first significant budget increase, the field 
began to organize itself into two broad camps: scholars and officials forecasting escalating U.S.-
China military competition, and scholars recognizing the damage a bipolar, major-power 
competition could do to Asia’s security. American research on Asia’s security environment 
shifted towards analyzing how China’s rise would affect the Asia-Pacific’s constituent nations, 
and consequently America’s security posture in the region (Friedberg, 2011).  
 The U.S. military’s colleges house more hawkish perspectives on U.S.-China relations, 
drawing from geopolitics and military theories to analyze future competition. Drawing on the 
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geopolitical realism of 19th and 20th century strategists such as Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sir Halford 
Mackinder and Nicholas J. Spykman, scholars from the U.S. National Defense University, the 
Naval War College and the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) argue that 
China’s rise poses an existential strategic threat to American maritime power. In an echo of John 
Mearsheimer’s Offensive Realism, Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes have brought 
geopolitical precepts to bear on China’s naval strategy, arguing that PLA generals studied the 
maritime theories of Mahan in order to grow the regional strength of their navy (Holmes & 
Yoshihara 2007; 2018). Similarly, National Defense University research initiatives have 
examined President Xi Jinping’s consolidation of power over the PLA, focusing on his effect on 
the PLA’s ability to conduct joint-operations in any conflict in the Pacific Ocean (Saunders, 
Ding, Scobell, et al., 2019).  
The scholarship of the think-tank community on the subject is conducted by a core mix of 
former government officials who conduct research across a range of institutions. Their failure to 
examine prior inaccuracies in U.S.-China policy magnifies the potential impact of discursive 
failures across think-tanks and government agencies. For example, a major study conducted by 
Ashley Tellis and Robert Blackwill—both former National Security Council staffers under 
President George W. Bush—for The Council on Foreign Relations argued that because, “the 
American effort to “integrate” China into the liberal international order has now generated new 
threats to U.S. primacy in Asia…Washington needs a new grand strategy toward China that 
centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy.” 
This report provided the intellectual foundation for hawkish perspectives to gain traction 
(Blackwill & Tellis, 2015, p. 4). Left out of its analysis was how American grand strategy 
interacted with Chinese nationalism. Instead, its focus was on Yoshihara’s (2018) “impelling” 
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structural forces in China’s politics. CSBA and defense policy scholars have attempted to 
describe China’s vision of its hegemony and its strategic conceptions of U.S.-China security 
competition (Rolland, 2020; Yoshihara, Friedberg & Rolland 2020). Their research finds that 
President Xi envisions Chinese leadership of the international system, with a region-wide 
Chinese sphere of influence (Rolland, 2020). Other research examines the contours of China’s 
military strategy (Fravel, 2019).  
Three major scholars demonstrate the divide between those who argue for escalating 
competition, and those who believe it acts against the interests of Asian nations. In a recurring 
pattern, their arguments lie parallel to the major debates in International Relations Theory. 
Thomas Christensen—Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs 
from 2006-2008—argues that great-power competition between the U.S. and China need not lead 
to a Cold War (Christensen, 2020; 2015). However, peer scholars such as David Kang—Director 
of the University of Southern California’s Korea Studies Institute— and Susan Shirk—Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 1997-2000— oppose the 
broader presumption of competition being inevitable. They argue that China’s rise is not 
necessarily an existential threat to Asian nations, and that both the U.S. and China need not 
engage in great-power competition (Kang, 2017; Shirk, 2008). Similar to Liberal perspectives of 
China’s international relations, Shirk (2008) argued that China’s economic development 
heightened political insecurities in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Kang (2017) finds that 
Asian nations have not adopted security policies which would indicate a fear of China’s regional 
rise. This raises the question: Is the U.S. foreign policy community accurately conceptualizing 
the potential risks of China’s behavior in Asia today? 
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Regional security studies as a whole are concerned with providing U.S. policymakers an 
accurate interpretation of China’s security strategy. However, in its shift towards great-power 
competition as a result of COVID-19, it lacks an understanding of how prior debates have gotten 
China wrong, and how policy discourse can lead to policy failures. As demonstrated by military 
scholarship and think-tank initiatives, the field is populated by a core group of scholars and ex-
government officials, multiplying the impact of this oversight on U.S. foreign policy.  
The Need for Introspection: 
International relations literature across its constituent disciplines does not provide 
discourse analysis on why U.S. officials failed to understand China in the Marshall Mission 
(1945-1947).  With the Mission’s failure to unify Mao Zedong’s Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) and Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Party (KMT) leading to China’s Civil War, it stands as 
a major event in history with significant lessons for U.S.-China relations in the 21st century. The 
Marshall Mission was the Truman Administration’s attempt to shape postwar China using 
Realist theories of international politics. The failure of the Mission demonstrates a more subtle 
failure by Realism in its encounter with Chinese nationalism. For this reason, the Marshall 
Mission is a critical source of insight into international relations theory and U.S.-China 
competition in the 21st century, where the Biden Administration increasingly relies upon Realist 
policies, while President Xi increasingly adopts nationalist stances.  
Diplomatic histories provide the best insights into the Mission, because many scholars 
have included the Marshall Mission in their periodization of the Korean War and pre- and post-
war American foreign policy in Asia. However, the Mission’s intellectual constructs are not the 
focus of existing scholarship. Bruce Cumings (2004), discusses Dean Acheson’s theorizing of 
U.S. security postures in Asia from 1947-1950, arguing that U.S. foreign policy sought to set a 
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bulwark in Asia against Communism based either in Taiwan or at the 38th Parallel on the Korean 
Peninsula. Chalmers Johnson (1962) identified the role “revolutionary” peasant nationalism 
played in Mao’s expansion of the CCP during its war against Japan, but did not analyze the 
Marshall Mission’s inability to grasp such nationalism. Similarly, Barbara Tuchman (1971) 
argued that the corruption of Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT frustrated U.S. policy aims before the 
Marshall Mission, but did not extend her argument to a comprehensive examination of the 
Mission’s discourse. Christensen (1995) rebuts the notion that a “Lost Chance” for U.S.-CCP 
rapprochement existed in 1949, analyzing Maoist thought towards the Truman Administration. 
However, the discourse of decision-making during the Marshall Mission is not his focus. 
Michael Schaller (2016) demonstrates that the U.S. Army Observer Group known as the Dixie 
Mission favored a U.S. policy that backed Mao and bucked Chiang Kai-Shek. Schaller (2016) 
illustrates how while living with the CCP in Yan’an from 1944-1947, this group’s 
communications with Washington were obstructed by the psychologically-delusional 
Ambassador Hurley. This manuscript includes Hurley’s communications starting in August of 
1945 to contextualize the Truman Administration’s China discourse, but does not exclusively 
focus on Hurley. Additionally, the 1944-1945 time period lies outside the scope of this paper’s 
examination of discourse after Imperial Japan’s surrender in World War II, on August 15, 1945. 
While this sub-field critically examines U.S. policy towards China before, during, and after 
World War II, it does not analyze the Realist discourse of the Marshall Mission (1945-1947).  
This paper uses discourse analysis to explore the epistemological assumptions and 
themes which shaped U.S. policy towards China during the Marshall Mission, arguing that U.S. 
policymakers’ inability to understand China stemmed from their Realist constructs, great-power 
frameworks, and theories of geopolitical realism, preventing a full analysis of Mao Zedong and 
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the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) postcolonial nationalism. It argues that a similar gap 
between the Biden Administration’s Realism and President Xi’s nationalism may exist today. 
Research Design: 
 In this paper, I use discourse analysis to explore why U.S. officials failed to accurately 
predict Chinese behavior during the Marshall Mission (1945-1947). I identify the discursive 
limitations in U.S. policy that prevented a full understanding of China. In my conclusion, I 
compare the failure of Realist discourse to U.S.-China relations in the 21st century, particularly 
from 2020-2021. To conduct my discourse analysis, I examined almost 200 documents from the 
U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Relations of the United States collection. My focus within 
the collection was on the years 1945-1946. Specifically, I read documents 304-344, and 
documents 541-578 from the 1945 Far East collection. I also read documents 1-29, 124-140, and 
420-470 from the 1946 Far East: China collections. In order to analyze Mao Zedong as a 
postcolonial nationalist, I read the first 21 speeches, reports, and letters published by China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in On Diplomacy, which covered the years 1937-1947. Taken as a 
whole, these documents form the core of my discourse analysis. 
 I answer my question inductively, using discourse analysis to develop a broader claim 
about why Realist American security discourse failed in its encounter with Mao’s nationalism. 
The larger object being studied is the effect of Realist, great-power assumptions and 
epistemological constructs on U.S. security discourse. My project restricts its focus to the 
Marshall Mission in order to provide a specific, deep analysis of these constructs during this key 
moment in the U.S.-China relationship. Mao’s postcolonial nationalism established the ideology 
of the CCP, which persists into the 21st century and drives Chinese perspectives of American 
maritime strategy (Kissinger, 2011). My conclusion uses this continuity to briefly compare the 
14 
 
Biden Administration’s security discourse on China, arguing that it fails to grasp the drivers of 
President Xi Jinping’s nationalism because it is a discourse rooted in geopolitical realism.  
Alternate Methodological Approaches: 
 Discourse analysis of the Marshall Mission (1945-1947) is an appropriate methodological 
framework for my research. While its inductive, qualitative nature of inquiry distinguishes it 
from deductive, hypothesis-based political science, these features ultimately strengthen its 
analytical power.  
Deductive, variable-based case studies, military doctrine studies and grand strategy 
methodologies appear often in current U.S.-based international relations research into U.S.-China 
competition. Taylor Fravel and Graham Allison, respectively, have re-introduced deductive case 
study methodologies into the discipline. Fravel’s scholarship on China’s border conflicts seeks to 
identify variables which caused China to use cooperation or conflict to resolve its border disputes 
during the 20th century (Fravel, 2008). Similarly, Allison’s comparative case studies of rising-
power trajectories seek to pinpoint the key variable which determines whether rising-powers will 
fight a war against an established great-power, controlling for different rival explanations 
(Allison, 2017). Military doctrine studies use similar analytical frameworks, attempting to 
forecast China’s military strategy into the coming decades using probabilities of “lead 
indicators” of likely military scenarios (Yoshihara, Friedberg, Rolland et. al., 2020). And lastly, 
grand strategy methodologies have embraced increasingly pseudo-quantitative methods as well. 
Certain scholars analyze China’s grand strategy by identifying recurring variables across China’s 
20th century history, arguing that a continuous “Chinese national interest” has existed despite 
leadership changes (Khan, 2018). Problematically, such deductive methodologies are enmeshed 
in Realist security theories of hegemony, which predict states will exist in a struggle for power-
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maximization in the international system because of their national interests (Mearsheimer, 2014). 
This manuscript demonstrates that in its perceived struggle for power with the Soviet Union, 
U.S. discourse could not analyze the importance of postcolonialism in China. 
Discourse analysis focuses on the processes through which political-social reality is 
constructed, often focusing on individuals’ writing to assess the intellectual constructs baked into 
their thinking. National leaders and other influential actors may act as agents of “construction” 
(Holzscheiter, 2014; Fierke, 2002; Milliken, 1999; Said, 1978).  
Discourse Analysis and International Relations: 
A leading member of France’s Freudian School, Michel de Certeau’s The Writing of 
History (1992) provides the intellectual context for my discourse analysis. His work rethought 
the configuration of history itself. In the translator’s introduction, Tom Conley (1992) writes, 
““discursive formations” produce the ideological range of représentation, what [de Certeau] calls 
“the limits of what can be thought.”” I attempt to focus on how Realist discourses constructed 
the “limits of what can be thought”, in the context of the Marshall Mission (1945-1947) and 
U.S.-China relations more broadly.  
Holzscheiter (2014) provides a definition of discourse analysis where, “discourse analysis 
is an engagement with…the linguistic and communicative processes through which social reality 
is constructed.” Accordingly, “discourse” may be defined as “the space where intersubjective 
meaning is created, sustained, transformed and, accordingly, becomes constitutive of social 
reality,” (Holzscheiter, 2014). For other scholars, discourse, “approaches language as a picture of 
the logic of reality,” (Fierke, 2002). It follows that in international relations and political science, 
discourse can be understood as the medium used by humans to construct their political realities. 
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In discourse analysis, the actors who construct Holzscheiter’s “social reality” are elevated in 
place of the state. Consequently, discourse analysis tends to appear in constructivist, post-
structuralist, postmodernist, feminist and social-constructivist scholarship (Milliken, 1999).  
The constructivist nature of discourse analysis makes it well-suited for research into 
American security discourse on China during the Marshall Mission, when U.S. officials sought 
frames of reference to make sense of their status as the world’s pre-eminent great-power, in the 
days, weeks, and months after World War II. Discourse analysis in international relations targets 
such acts of construction, asking, “for the social and political effects…of particular constructions 
of reality on the agency and identity of individuals and groups. Any singular event of speaking or 
producing text…is part of a larger social and political process.” (Holzscheiter, 2014). My 
research identifies how Realist discourse placed limits on what could be thought about China, 
creating a Realist, geopolitical, great-power context around which China was intellectually 
organized. Policymakers from the U.S., CCP, and Chiang Kai-Shek’s KMT each experienced a 
degree of subjective, constructed reality which informed their thinking, their actions, and their 
behavior. As de Certeau (1992) made clear, examining the discourse which underpins the 
process of construction is an effective method of identifying the source of its “social and political 
effects”. In my research, I argue that Realist constructs, great-power frameworks, and theories of 
geopolitical realism led to the political effect of America’s failure to understand Mao Zedong’s 
postcolonial nationalism.  
Source Material and Qualitative Analysis: 
Approaching the Foreign Relations of the United States collection and Mao Zedong’s On 
Diplomacy, I analyzed how publications, memoranda, reports, intelligence analyses, cables and 
summaries of China demonstrated specific constructions of political reality which were 
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inaccurate. I identified Realist international relations theories as the chief operative influence in 
this discourse, tracing their argumentative structures. 
The Department of State’s Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) record from 
1945-1947 contains thousands of documents, representing officials’ thinking regarding China 
during the moments I am studying. In doing so, they also reflect policymakers’ embedded 
assumptions. I narrowed my focus to document sections which specifically included political 
analyses of the political conditions in China, ensuring my discourse analysis drew from the 
documents best able to represent how U.S. officials made sense of China. These documents 
included crucial examples of policy discourse, including Ambassador Hurley’s recommendations 
from his post in China to Secretary of State James Byrnes, Department-wide summaries 
concerning the future of Mao Zedong’s Communist Party and Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist 
Party, and the strategic debates of Commanding General Wedemeyer and Chief of Staff George 
Marshall; FRUS offered a whole-of-government perspective on the postwar Marshall Mission.  
In order to measure the accuracy of American policy discourse from these official 
documents, I analyzed the founding ideology of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), reading 
On Diplomacy as a representation of Maoist thinking. Shirk (2008) highlights the top-down 
organizational structure of the CCP, noting the massive policy transition ushered in when Deng 
Xiaoping replaced Mao Zedong (Shirk, 2008, p.18). The emphasis on top-down leadership meant 
that Mao Zedong spoke for the entire party. By extension, I can credibly state that Mao’s 






American policymaking discourse on China during the Marshall Mission (1945-1947) 
was rooted in the language of great-power politics and geopolitical realism, and in its operative 
assumptions, reflected core beliefs held by Realist theories of international relations. This Realist 
framework left no intellectual space to analyze the postcolonial nationalism of Mao Zedong’s 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), or its corollary vision of security in Asia. For the Marshall 
Mission, this resulted in a failure to grasp the locus of CCP power until the CCP’s military 
victory in China’s Civil War appeared increasingly likely. In the broader context of American 
foreign policy and Asian security, the legacy of this moment lies in its outlier status amidst an 
Asia reconstituted by postwar U.S. hegemony. As General Marshall embarked on his mission, 
the partition of the Korean Peninsula and the structural reconstruction of Japan—bolstered by 
U.S. air and naval basing in Okinawa and Guam—were just beginning. In this respect, the 
Mission’s failure to construct a U.S.-oriented China left a legacy felt into the 21st century: a 
divergent vision of Asian security, seated in the CCP. In its demonstration of the limitations of 
Realist thought in analyzing nationalist movements, the Mission provides critical insights for 
U.S.-China relations in the 21st century, and for international relations theory more broadly. 
Mao Zedong as a Postcolonial Nationalist 
 Mao Zedong’s speeches, essays and interviews from 1937-1947 illuminate the 
undercurrent of postcolonial and anti-Japanese nationalism which drove the CCP’s ideology. 
Marxist-Leninist theory certainly pervaded Mao’s writing, but the role postcolonial nationalism 
played in the CCP’s vision of Asia’s international relations suggests it was a defining feature of 
Maoist thought. From 1937-1945, Mao laid out the crux of his vision, situating the CCP’s theory 
of postcolonial, nationalist international relations against Japan’s invasion of China—and by 
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extension, against hegemony which restricted China’s agency in the Western Pacific. By 
mistaking this nationalism for Communism because of major-power tensions with the U.S.S.R., 
U.S. policymakers during the Marshall Mission constructed an intellectual monolith wherein the 
CCP was a mere extension of the Soviet Union. The Truman Administration misunderstood the 
core nationalism of Mao’s ideology because it viewed China through Realist, great-power 
frameworks.  
In 1937, Mao articulated his nationalism in the context of China’s war with Japan, but 
established principles which by 1945 would encompass a broader vision of Asian security upheld 
by liberated, independent Asian countries. Mao believed that the Soviet Union represented the 
strongest great-power ally available to the CCP in its resistance to Japan’s invasion. In declaring 
an anti-Japanese foreign policy, Mao argued that China needed to, “…closely unite with the 
Soviet Union, the country which is most reliable, most powerful, and most capable of helping 
China to resist Japan.”2 However, in this same declaration, Mao emphasized national pride and 
set the limits of foreign assistance, arguing that China alone needed to be responsible for Japan’s 
military defeat. Evaluating potential major-power partners, Mao called on the CCP to, “Enlist the 
sympathy of Britain, the United States, and France for our resistance to Japan, and secure their 
help provided that it entails no loss of our territory or our sovereign rights.” 3 Indeed, Mao 
believed the CCP, “…should rely mainly on our own strength to defeat the Japanese aggressors; 
but foreign aid cannot be dispensed with, and an isolationist policy will only play into the 
enemy’s hands.” 4 For Mao, the CCP’s independent prosecution of the war—augmented by 
foreign assistance—against Japan was of paramount importance. Unstated but implied was the 
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logical extension of this argument: by defeating Japan largely through its own efforts, the CCP 
could legitimate its presence in China as a liberating, anti-imperial force. In this way, Mao 
aligned the CCP’s aims with the fundamental existence of the Chinese state, and the future of the 
Chinese people.  
Two months later, in August of 1937, Mao repeated his limits on foreign assistance in the 
overthrow of Japanese imperialism. Mao advocated for concluding alliances, “…with all 
countries that are opposed to Japanese aggression, provided that this entails no loss of our 
territory or of our sovereign rights.”5 In this dictum, Mao again alluded to the legitimating 
process of war. Mao called for his troops to, “Fight to the finish in defense of northern China and 
the seacoast. Fight to the finish for the recovery of Beiping, Tianjin and northeastern China.”6 By 
“fighting to the finish”, Mao was calling for the CCP to make total sacrifice in “defense of” and 
in “recovery of” Chinese territory. Defending and recovering Japanese-held land at such expense 
again tied the CCP to the future of the Chinese state, laying an intellectual foundation whereby 
Mao’s guerillas would be responsible for China’s post-imperial security. From these early 
writings in 1937 emerge the contours of postcolonial nationalism in Maoist thought: resisting 
imperialism and regional hegemony, protecting sovereignty and territorial integrity, and gaining 
legitimacy through anti-imperial liberation.  
Starting in 1938, Mao applied these basic principles to broader world politics, developing 
a distinct theory of postcolonial international relations, underwritten by nationalism and 
grounded in resistance to hegemony. Delivering a speech in Yan’an in February, Mao placed 
China’s war with Japan in a global context. Mao viewed the meeting as one significant to all of 
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China, in its, “objective of combating wars of aggression” as waged by Japan.7 In the speech, 
Mao painted this objective as one pursued globally, where, “…the opposers to aggression are 
uniting the majority of the world’s peoples to safeguard world peace against aggressive wars.”8 
Applied to China, opposing Japanese aggression meant that the CCP did so on behalf of the 
Chinese people. The rest of the speech casts “the world’s peoples” as the deciding force in the 
battle against imperial aggression—and therefore in the CCP’s liberation of China. Mao believed 
that, “All Chinese people refusing to be slaves of a foreign power, regardless of party affiliation, 
belief, sex or age, are uniting to strive for an identical objective.”9 In this struggle, Mao placed 
the CCP on the side of the Chinese people, arguing that, “To combat aggression is our common 
objective.”10 As an instrument of, “The tremendous force of a united people all over China,” the 
CCP was positioned as a nationalist movement.11 It was the champion of China’s postcolonial 
liberation vis-à-vis Japanese hegemony, and a reflective microcosm of wider, global movements 
against wars of aggression which facilitated aggressive hegemonies.  
In the summer and fall of 1938, Mao outlined a basic, nationalist strategic doctrine to be 
employed in resisting wars of aggression, building on prior themes of liberation and territorial 
sovereignty. Its significance, however, lay in its implications for China’s perspective on security 
in Asia. While delivering his “On Protracted War,” lectures, Mao drew a distinction between just 
and unjust wars, claiming that, “All wars that are progressive are just, and all wars that impede 
progress are unjust.”12 Applied to the war with Japan, Mao argued that, “The revolutionary wars 
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which have already begun are part of the war for perpetual peace. The war between China and 
Japan…will take an important place in this war for perpetual peace, and out of it will come the 
liberation of the Chinese nation.”13 For Mao, revolutionary wars were to be fought against 
capitalism.14 Despite this Marxist bent, progressive, just wars remained tied to liberation from 
imperialism. By extension, unjust wars impeded progress, suppressing postcolonial sovereignty. 
Mao believed that, 
“The way to oppose [unjust] war of this kind is to do everything possible to prevent it before it 
breaks out and, once it breaks out, to oppose war with war, to oppose unjust war with just war, 
whenever possible…Japan’s war is an unjust war that impedes progress.”15 
 
Broadly, Mao framed a policy of preventive deterrence by calling for the prevention of unjust 
war before it broke out. Deterrence would take effect before China was threatened—for example, 
preventing Japan from invading China at all. For the future, Mao’s logic implicitly called for the 
deterrence of threats to China’s postcolonial liberation, to be realized through the CCP’s 
struggle. As demonstrated, Mao’s theory of liberation encompassed the recovery of territory in 
northern China, and the CCP’s overthrow of Japanese imperialism. Deterring threats to this 
progress meant resisting hegemony which threatened China’s sovereignty. In other words, Mao 
sought to deter future wars of aggression, seeking to prevent the rise or establishment of another 
Asian hegemon which could threaten China in the Western Pacific.  
 Despite Mao’s belief in a global struggle against aggression, in 1939 he was careful to 
distinguish China’s war in the Pacific from World War II, fusing his just war theory with 
postcolonialism and nationalism to do so. Recalling the tropes from his speech in Yan’an in 
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February of 1938, Mao cast the Chinese people as the vehicle of China’s liberation from Japan. 
In the preface to the English translation of his On Protracted War, Mao stated that, “In the great 
War of Resistance…there is no doubt that the forces in China, now that they are called into 
action, will not only become invincible, but also subdue the enemy and drive him away.”16 The 
ramifications of this swelling force within China became clear in September of 1939. In an 
interview with A New China Daily—on the same day as Germany’s invasion of Poland—Mao 
discussed China’s trajectory in the coming war. One possibility was, “…perseverance in 
resistance, unity and progress, which would mean national rejuvenation.”17 The “forces in 
China” would liberate the country through their resistance, leading to a postcolonial “national 
rejuvenation” for the nation. Analyzing the constellation of global alliances, Mao claimed both 
the Allies and the Axis powers were, “fighting for the domination of colonies” while “waging a 
predatory war”, meaning that, “This war is not at all a just war. The only just wars are non-
predatory wars, wars of liberation.”18 Fundamentally, the situation in China was different from 
the conflict enveloping the world. China’s war was a just war of resistance, of progress, and of 
liberation—a nationalist war for a postcolonial future.  
 Mao distilled China’s foreign policy during World War II from this basic difference, 
establishing an understanding of the war which would diverge from that held by U.S. officials 
during the Marshall Mission. Following his interview with A New China Daily, Mao wrote,   
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“To maintain that China should join the Anglo-French imperialist war front is a capitulator’s 
view, which is harmful to the War of Resistance [against Japan] as well as to the independence 
and liberation of the Chinese nation, and it should be flatly rejected.”19 
 
Mao’s reasoning rested on the logic and meaning of capitulation. Framing the Allied war effort 
as an “Anglo-French” project of imperialism positioned it as the antithesis of China’s war for 
liberation and sovereignty. Surrendering to this “front” was to pollute the CCP’s ideology. If 
China needed to become a formal Allied power in order to defeat Japan, Mao’s emphasis on self-
liberation with foreign aid would be null; the invincibility of the Chinese people would be 
proven false. Logically, such an alliance would render void the roots of China’s war. Stemming 
from this argument for differentiation, Mao subtly illustrated a worldview consisting of imperial 
powers, and countries seeking the overthrow of imperialism.  
 Sorting international relations into major-power imperialism and postcolonial struggle 
lent itself to a corollary vision of security in Asia. In 1940, Mao began to connect the theories 
underpinning China’s resistance to Japan with regional East Asian order. According to Mao, the 
CCP’s foreign policy was predicated on its distinctions between how world powers behaved in 
East Asia and the Pacific.20 These distinctions were,  
“…between German and Italian imperialism which are allies of Japan and have recognized 
‘Manchukuo’ and British and U.S. imperialism which are opposed to Japan, and between the 
Britain and the United States of yesterday which followed a Munich policy in the Far East and 
undermined China’s resistance to Japan, and the Britain and the United States of today which 
have abandoned this policy and are now in favor of China’s resistance.”21 
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By building a foreign policy on such distinctions, Mao indicated what actions were most 
important in evaluating major-powers. Specifically, evaluations rested upon countries’ 
recognition of Manchukuo—the puppet state run by Japan in formerly-Chinese Manchuria—and 
countries’ appeasement of Japan’s aggression. Conceptually, Mao was evaluating how nations 
reacted to aggressive hegemony in the Pacific; his distinctions were grounded in how the U.S., 
Britain, Germany, and Italy treated the prosecution of unjust war. Against the backdrop of Mao’s 
prior speeches, lectures, and writings, his distinctions between types of imperialism appears to 
contradict his organization of international relations into imperial and colonial powers. Anti-
Japanese sentiment, however, proved his discriminating tool: in the hierarchy of Mao’s ideology, 
resistance to Japan was ranked higher than being a perceived imperial power. Consequently, 
American and British imperialism could be reconciled with the CCP’s aims because they became 
invested in China’s war of resistance. This benchmark fed into Mao’s analysis of East Asia. 
Comparing the U.S. and Britain’s regional foreign policies before and after 1939 to the Munich 
Agreement, which appeased German fascism, Mao subtly argued that both countries were 
transitory powers in Asia. In other words, their actions in the region were not constant, but 
circumstantial. If Germany, Italy, and Japan were in conflict with postcolonialism in Asia, and 
the U.S. and Britain were not reliable allies in the struggle for liberation, then who could 
permanently uphold regional security? In their omission from this analysis and in their 
subjugation by the major-powers, Asian colonies were left as the only viable guarantors of a 
future, postcolonial order. 
 Mao left this conclusion implied until 1945. Two weeks before the Allies declared 
victory in Europe, Mao issued a report to the Seventh National Congress of the CCP, laying out 
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his vision for a postwar Asia.22 Mao’s theory of nationalism crystallized into a philosophy 
holding that, “The people, and the people alone, are the motive force in the making of world 
history.”23 Indeed, the people would, “…win the war, win the peace, and win progress.”24 As the 
arm of this animating force, the CCP was intellectually aligned with similar movements across 
Asia, in the name of liberation. This alignment resulted in a postcolonial geography stretching 
from India to Japan. Mao stated,  
“…it will be necessary to help all the democratic forces of the Japanese people to establish their 
own democratic system so that Japanese fascism and militarism may be thoroughly wiped out, 
together with their political, economic and social roots. Unless the Japanese people have a 
democratic system…it will be impossible to ensure peace in the Pacific.”25 
 
The CCP echoed this argument for Korea, India and Southeast Asia:  
“We consider…the independence of Korea to be correct. The Chinese people should help the 
Korean people win liberation. We hope that India will attain independence…an independent and 
democratic India…is essential for world peace. As regards…Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Vietnam 
and the Philippines—we hope that after the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, their people 
will…establish independent and democratic states of their own.”26 
 
In Japan, Korea, India, Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines, Mao placed the 
CCP on the side of the people. Mao’s vision therefore rested upon sovereign Asian states. Left 
implied was the logic that their liberation was in the interest of the CCP because such forces 
opposed aggression. In 1938, for example, Mao had declared, “the world’s peoples [have united] 
to safeguard world peace against aggressive wars.”27 The Asia-Pacific Mao sought was free of 
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imperialism; postcolonial order from the Western Pacific to the Indian Ocean was the path to 
China’s permanent security from hegemony. Combined with his theory of deterring unjust wars, 
this report hinted at the lengths Mao would go to in order to realize such a security environment.  
August-December 1945: Constructing a Realist Discourse 
 In the wake of Imperial Japan’s surrender on August 15th, 1945 and their newfound 
global power emerging from World War II, American officials immediately turned their 
attention to postwar peace and security in Asia. U.S. diplomats’ Realist discourse laid the 
foundation for President Truman’s Realist policy towards China, which would be articulated in 
December of 1945. From the outset, officials such as Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley and 
Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. Averell Harriman cast the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as little 
more than a guerilla force, while also positioning the CCP and China more broadly relative to the 
Soviet Union. In this moment and through this Realist discourse, Mao’s postcolonial nationalism 
was elided; American discourse began to erase any distinction between the CCP and the Soviet 
Union, constructing a Communist monolith which stretched from East Berlin to Yan’an. As a 
result, the great-power contours of President Truman’s policy found their antecedents in the 
months leading up to General Marshall’s trans-Pacific voyage. Before the Marshall Mission 
began, China and the CCP had been subsumed by major-power, geopolitical concerns in the 
broader project of securing American hegemony on the flanks of the Eurasian landmass, in the 
interregnum between World War II and the commencement of the Cold War. 
Less than 24 hours after Japan’s surrender, Ambassador Hurley sent a telegram to 
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes establishing concerns about the CCP’s intentions in China. 
The Ambassador’s analysis positioned the CCP as a hostile force free of nationalist motivations. 
On the night of Japan’s surrender, Ambassador Hurley met with Chiang Kai-Shek—leader of 
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China’s Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and the President of the Republic of China—in 
Chongqing, to recommend inviting Mao Zedong to discuss China’s future.28 Ambassador Hurley 
shifted the burden of peace in China onto Mao, declaring that if Mao accepted the invitation, 
then, “…the armed conflict between the Communist Party of China and the National 
Government may be reduced to a political controversy.”29 For the Ambassador, the question of, 
“whether Japan will be permitted to surrender any of her arms to the armed Communist Party in 
China?” could derail Chiang’s relationship with Mao.30 The reason for this source of tension, 
however, was not a complex one, with Ambassador Hurley arguing that, “Unquestionably…the 
Communists desire to acquire Japanese arms to continue their position as a belligerent within 
China.”31 His articulation of the postwar tensions in China constructed a logic of reality whereby 
Mao became a belligerent bent on seeking the surrender of Japan’s arms to the CCP for ulterior 
purposes, while Chiang sought to reduce tensions to a “political controversy”. In this intellectual 
universe of binary, unquestionable motives, Mao’s nationalism could not be the driving force of 
his desire to accept Japan’s surrender; his place in China was reduced to that of a hostile, 
belligerent guerilla.  
The officials surrounding Ambassador Hurley shared his analysis, deepening 
policymakers’ inability to grasp the postcolonialism which drove Mao and thereby establishing 
divergent memories of China’s liberation. Harry Stevens, the Second Secretary of the U.S. 
Embassy in China, wrote Ambassador Hurley that the CCP’s retention of Japanese arms in 
Shaanxi represented, “…such defiance on the part of the Communists,” which showed, “…the 
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faction’s lack of appreciation for Allied assistance in liberating the homeland from Japanese 
domination, but also its unpatriotic determination to arm for civil war…”.32 The Secretary’s 
argument reprimanded Mao and the CCP, describing them as a group of immature, illogical 
belligerents. With their newfound liberation, why would the CCP seek to begin arming for civil 
war? For Secretary Stevens and his peers, such behavior could only be explained by ingratitude, 
or an “unpatriotic” idiocy which failed to grasp China’s national interest in avoiding civil war. 
Alongside this nascent discourse, America’s diplomats in the Soviet Union began 
discussing CCP-Soviet designs for China, gradually bringing China into great-power dialectics. 
The day after Japan’s surrender, Soviet diplomats met with Adam Watson, from the British 
Embassy, to discuss their growing, ““perplexity” as to why the United States appeared to be so 
interested in China.”33 Indeed, the Soviet officials became suspicious of U.S. intentions when 
meeting Ambassador Averell Harriman, whose eyes allegedly, “glittered when the subject of 
China was mentioned…”” and led the Soviets to believe that, “…the Americans appeared to be 
particularly interested in the Chinese Communists.”34 In this fog of suspicion, The Second 
Secretary of the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union assuaged George F. Kennan—then Counselor 
to the Embassy—that, “When asked what Soviet interests in China were Pavlov disavowed any 
Soviet concern over internal Chinese affairs.”35 Despite this assurance, the basic, mutually-
shared suspicion and fear implicitly organized Chiang Kai-Shek’s government and Mao 
Zedong’s guerillas around major-power polarities. As a result, future discussion of China by U.S. 
 
32 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII, eds. David M. Baehler, Herbert 
A. Fine, Ralph R. Goodwin, N. Stephen Kane, Ronald D. Landa, Lisle A. Rose, William F. Sanford, Jr., and Ilana 
M. Stern (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), 305. 





officials in the buildup to President Truman’s Realist China policy would revolve around great-
power competition, and the geopolitics of U.S. and Soviet positions in Asia.  
By the fall of 1945, Averell Harriman and George F. Kennan presented Soviet 
propaganda concerning China as evidence that the Soviets and the CCP were coordinating their 
messaging, and by implication, could well be coordinating their actions in China. On August 29, 
1945, Ambassador Harriman cabled Secretary Byrnes to describe a significant article in the 
Soviet Ministry of Defence’s official Red Star newspaper.36 According to Harriman, it argued 
that, “1. China cannot continue to be a backward, semifeudal state. 2. Efforts to maintain reaction 
will provoke “democratic” resistance. 3. USSR and world democratic forces support democratic 
development of China. 4. Agents of Japanese imperialism are now seeking to disrupt democratic 
unity.”37 Harriman presented two conclusions. The first hardened latent suspicions that the 
Soviets were the patron of the CCP, because the publication “carries the first statement in our 
memory of categorical Soviet support of Chinese “democratic” forces.”38 Strengthening the link 
between the CCP and the Soviets initiated the elimination of Mao Zedong’s postcolonial 
nationalism from policy discourse, gradually reducing the CCP to little more than a Soviet pawn.  
Of equal importance, Harriman and Kennan’s campaign dismissed Soviet propaganda’s 
anti-Japanese overtones as an analog to Soviet propaganda in Europe, thereby overlooking the 
growing anti-Japanese sentiment in China by subsuming it under great-power geopolitics. 
Harriman’s second conclusion tied China into the latticework of U.S.-U.S.S.R. competition 
across Eurasia, arguing that, “The hint that agents of Japanese imperialism seek to disrupt 
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democratic unity in China hints at the technique employed in Europe of identifying as Fascist 
every opponent of the Popular Front movement.”39 In short, Soviet propaganda on China 
mattered because it portended Soviet proxy support for the CCP, and because it fit into a wider 
pattern of major-power tension. Lost in this analysis was the question of why the Soviet Union, 
in their mission “to disrupt democratic unity” would target semi-feudalism, “democratic” 
resistance, and the shadow of Japanese imperialism in China. If the goal was disruption, then 
these three issues were clearly seen as pivotal—the Soviets sought to inflame anti-Japanese 
sentiment, while Harriman’s emphasis on great-power tactics overlooked it.  
As Harriman continued to convince President Truman and Secretary Byrnes of the 
crystallizing great-power dimensions of China’s civil divide, events in China demonstrated that 
the breach was one pitting divergent memories of the war against Japan against one another. On 
August 30th, Major General Clayton Bissell sent War Department intelligence memorandums to 
Washington, claiming that, “Shanghai is reported surrounded by Communist forces who have 
expressed determination to fight should Central Government forces attempt to enter the city.”40 
Presumably, the CCP forces recalled Mao’s demand that they fight to the finish in defense of and 
in recovery of China’s coastline. Refusing to allow Chiang’s National Government to enter 
Shanghai and re-establish his authority was to refuse to cede the grounds for the CCP’s 
nationalist war for a postcolonial future. Problematically, as local tensions were accelerating 
towards confrontation, America’s China policy continued to bend towards great-power 
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competition. Great-power politics was crucial to understanding potential conflict in China, but 
using it exclusively was to omit nationalism entirely from policy debates.  
Ambassador Harriman continued to frame China’s conflict in terms of U.S.-Soviet 
competition. He depicted Red Star propaganda as the groundwork for a Soviet policy seeking to 
weaken Chiang Kai-Shek’s legitimacy. Re-organizing the sentences from another publication, he 
described a logic in which, “…a significant series of associations [leave] door open to place 
responsibility on Chungking [Chongqing] if agreement with Yenan [Yan’an] is not reached.”41 
In the context of KMT-CCP relations, Harriman believed the Soviets were attempting to force 
Chiang into granting Mao concessions, leveraging him with the threat of, “…accusations that 
certain Chungking elements collaborate with Jap diversionists. Same holds true for Chungking 
forces sent to liberated areas.”42 In Harriman’s analysis, Mao was evidently powerless to 
negotiate unless the Soviets backed him. Following Harriman’s argument, the Soviets were 
attempting to gain de facto hegemony over China, with the CCP as their vehicle to dominion.  
On-the-ground realities, however, revealed how nationalism was driving conflict in 
China. Within the CCP, Mao’s authority itself was challenged in the name of postcolonial 
nationalism. Secretary Stevens reported intelligence that the Military Chief of the CCP, Zhu De, 
apparently believed “…that the Communist troops under his command would not tolerate any 
compromise made by Mao Tze-tung at Chungking which might challenge…Chu’s…command of 
18th Army forces.”43 Zhu’s argument revealed his perception of the nationalist sources of CCP 
power. Contrasting his position relative to Mao, Zhu believed that he, “…represents 200,000,000 
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people in this country, most of whom are…residing in areas formerly under Japanese control, 
and that Mao’s influence is primarily among several million party adherents…that have never 
been occupied by the Japanese.”44 Zhu felt assured of his ability to force negotiating parameters 
on Mao based on what he would “tolerate” because his authority was derived from the anti-
Japanese nationalism of local populations. So convinced was Zhu of postcolonial nationalism’s 
power that he urged Mao to, “…constantly bear in mind that, with or without Soviet backing, 
their 1,000,000 regulars and 2,000,000 guerrillas were more than a match for any force that the 
Central Government could muster against them.”45 While American officials increasingly 
refracted the CCP through Harriman’s prism of great-power relations with the Soviet Union, the 
Military Chief of all CCP forces believed the Soviets to be redundant; growing nationalism 
across China was more important to his success than major-power patronage.  
American diplomats’ projection of great-power politics onto China solidified into a 
shaping discourse in the ensuing months, cementing the occlusion of postcolonial nationalism 
from the vocabulary of the Truman Administration. By mid-September, Harriman’s fixation on 
the Soviets was bolstered by a powerful ally: Chargé of the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union, 
George F. Kennan. Cabling Secretary Byrnes, Kennan heightened the suspicion over bilateral 
coordination established by Harriman. He claimed, “Similarity of CCP and Moscow line is not 
surprising. Timing is worth noting. First appearance in Soviet press of common line was in 
August 29 Red Star followed by stronger statement on August 31.”46 Harriman and Kennan’s 
conceptual interpretation of major-power patronage was not an isolated one, however. In 
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October, U.S. Consul Philip Sprouse analyzed a public statement issued by ten faculty members 
from China’s National Southwest Associated University for Secretary Byrnes.47 Sprouse applied 
the same framework as Harriman and Kennan in his positioning of the statement’s authors, 
claiming, “The writers represent the middle-of-the-road view of the Chinese “liberal”, who is the 
product of American or British higher education, and their sympathies have always been with the 
Anglo-Saxon powers, the members of the group being particularly pro-American.”48 This 
interpretation constructed a spectrum that organized China by great-power ideologies and sorted 
the Chinese people by their great-power affinities. Chinese liberalism was enabled by American 
and British tutelage, while Chinese Communism was nurtured by Soviet patronage. This elision 
of China’s agency complemented Harriman and Kennan’s argument, while also creating a subtle 
racial stratification of power in China. With China’s politics set relative to the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union, there could be no room for other, independent ideologies such as Mao’s 
postcolonial nationalism. 
The discursive foundation laid by U.S. officials set the contours of the Truman 
Administration’s Realist China policy, to be implemented by General Marshall. From December 
9th-December 15th, President Truman, General Marshall, Secretary of State Byrnes, 
Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs John Carter 
Vincent, and Chief of Staff to the President Admiral William Leahy used Realist constructs and 
great-power rivalry with the Soviet Union to craft the Marshall Mission’s objectives. The result 
was to place the Marshall Mission at loggerheads with Mao’s postcolonialism from its inception. 
Secretary Byrnes wrote a memorandum providing instructions to prepare the War Department to 
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support the Marshall Mission, expressing President Truman’s anxiety that, “…the unification of 
China by peaceful, democratic methods be achieved as soon as possible.”49 Byrnes 
simultaneously recast America’s war against Japan, implicitly establishing American 
preeminence in the Asia-Pacific region. He cited prior testimony before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, where he argued,  
“During the war the immediate goal of the United States in China was to promote a military 
union of the several political factions in order to bring their combined pow[e]r to bear upon our 
common enemy, Japan. Our longer-range goal, then as now, and a goal of at least equal 
importance, is the development of a strong, united, and democratic China.”50 
 
For Byrnes, the U.S. role in World War II’s Pacific theater was to “bring” the combined power 
of Mao and Chiang together, reflecting a balance of power with the U.S. as the region’s chief 
hegemon. As a result of this apex position, U.S. policy could set “longer-range” goals to fashion 
a security environment in Asia that rested upon a, “strong, united, and democratic China.” 
Byrnes also recalled Ambassador’s Hurley’s dismissal of Mao and the CCP as “belligerents”, 
calling on, “…the Central Government…as well as the various dissident elements…to 
compromise.”51 Juxtaposed against Byrnes’s implied understanding of American hegemony’s 
potential to re-shape the Pacific, his binary view of the “Central Government” and “various 
dissident elements” reflected the hazards of using great-power apertures to capture the situation 
in China. Viewed from a regional perspective, China’s CCP appeared to be a dissident, 
belligerent group standing in the way of a “strong, united, and democratic China” which would 
promote U.S. interests in the postwar Asia-Pacific. Discursively, it became lumped together with 
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Sprouse’s Chinese “liberal”, as a group which could not grasp Secretary Stevens’s impression of 
China’s obvious national interest. 
 Byrnes’s memo further demonstrated the occlusive effect of employing geopolitical, 
great-power discourse, as evidenced by its conversion of China’s social, nationalist reality rooted 
in memory into a phraseology of discrete, strategic objectives. In this language, the emotion of 
Mao’s postcolonialism was elided, allowing American policy to overlook its approaching 
confrontation with the CCP. Tellingly, Byrnes’s memo framed U.S. policy in the context of, “the 
China Theater”.52  Against this strategic backdrop, Byrnes articulated a policy revolving around 
elements and arrangements, calling for, “…arrangements to assist the Chinese National 
Government in transporting Chinese troops to Manchurian ports,” while emphasizing the 
importance of General Marshall’s attempt to convene, “a national conference of representatives 
of the major political elements” in China.53 China became the staging ground for U.S. power, a 
space over which American troops and supplies were moved, and political “elements” were to be 
fused into a unity government. Byrnes even stated that if negotiations failed, the U.S. should 
deploy Chiang’s troops into Manchuria directly, “to secure the long-term interests of the United 
States in the maintenance of international peace.”54 Viewing China as a project of geopolitical 
management in the context of newfound U.S. global power removed its clashing ideologies and 
swelling nationalism from U.S. discourse. As a result, Byrnes could confidently support a policy 
in which the U.S. military moved Chiang’s troops into “Manchurian ports”; the emotion Mao 
attached to the CCP’s war for a postcolonial future in northern China was unknown.  
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 In meetings from December 9th to December 11th, President Truman’s key foreign policy 
advisors demonstrated a Realist perspective on U.S. policy in China, assigning Manchuria 
importance because of its geostrategic position. By employing the same grammar of power as 
Secretary Byrnes, U.S. policy coalesced into a strategic project seeking to lock-in America’s 
hegemonic position in a postwar Asia. On December 10th, Byrnes held a meeting at the State 
Department with Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson, General Marshall, Director of the 
Office of Far Eastern Affairs John Carter Vincent, and Chief of Staff to the President Admiral 
William Leahy to set General Marshall’s agenda in China. Byrnes presented an argument 
representative of Classical Realist theories of international relations. According to minutes taken 
by Lieutenant General Hull, he argued that if the Marshall Mission failed, and China lay divided, 
“…we could expect Russia to ultimately take control of Manchuria and maintain a dominant 
influence in North China. His view was that there was no other step the Russians could be 
expected to take if China could not, itself, control Manchuria.”55 In short, the Russians would 
obey Morgenthau’s basic logic of great-powers, seeking to maximize their power in the existing 
world order by consolidating and expanding their territorial hegemony over North China.  
On December 11th, General Marshall echoed this analysis in a meeting with President 
Truman and Admiral Leahy, claiming that if negotiations failed, “there would follow the tragic 
consequences of a divided China and of a probable Russian reassumption of power in 
Manchuria, the combined effect of this resulting in the defeat or loss of the major purpose of our 
war in the Pacific.”56 With Imperial Japan defeated, the fact that a weakened China and 
hegemonic Russia would defeat “the major purpose” of America’s Pacific war hinted at the key 
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strategic condition of the postwar environment, now at risk: an Asia-Pacific free from a U.S. 
rival. The Marshall Mission, then, was part of a larger, geopolitical undertaking to secure 
America’s position of hegemonic supremacy in the Pacific. China was to be understood at the 
level of great-power strategies, not postcolonial tendencies. 
The result of this discourse was President Truman’s official statement on U.S. policy 
aims in China, issued to General Marshall upon his departure. The, “peace and prosperity of the 
world” depended upon, “the ability of the sovereign nations to combine for collective security in 
the United Nations organization.”57 In a prelude to the language of the Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan, the Truman Administration believed that, “a strong, united and democratic China 
is of the utmost importance to the success of this United Nations organization and for world 
peace” because, “a breach of peace anywhere in the world threatens the peace of the entire 
world.”58 Universalizing global security, however, simultaneously minimized the distinctions 
between regions in which peace could be threatened. Pursuing peace in China, the U.S., 
“recognizes and will continue to recognize the National Government of China and cooperate 
with it in international affairs”.59 As a result, being, “committed to the liberation of China, 
including the return of Manchuria to Chinese control” placed the U.S. and the CCP on a path to 
confrontation in North China.60  
The document also reflected America’s memory of World War II, in its, “continuation of 
the constant and close collaboration with the National Government of the Republic of China in 
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the prosecution of this war,”.61 Mao’s interpretation of the CCP’s role in fighting for China’s 
liberation lay in tension with this portrayal of U.S.-KMT joint operations. The document’s 
framework of Realist constructs, great-power relations, and geopolitical realism rendered it 
irreconcilable with the CCP’s emotional, postcolonial nationalism. As the culmination of 
American discourse since the surrender of Japan, President Truman’s U.S. Policy on China 
finalized the elimination of Mao’s nationalist interpretation of China’s social history and colonial 
memory from the discourse underpinning the Marshall Mission.  
The Marshall Mission (December 1945): Solidifying Great-Power Perspectives 
 The Realist discourse leading to the Marshall Mission affected its conduct, placing the 
U.S. on a path to confrontation with the CCP. Its effects would be felt in three moments:  
General Marshall’s first meetings (December 1945), first cease-fire negotiations (January-
February 1946), and the Manchurian Crisis (April-May 1946). Each of these moments 
demonstrated the blinkering effect of the Truman Administration’s Realist China policy on the 
parameters of U.S. discourse.  
 From the outset of the Mission, General Marshall focused on pursuing a policy that 
followed the Realist logic of prior debates and the Truman Administration’s U.S. Policy on 
China, embedding misunderstandings of Mao’s postcolonialism in the Mission’s agenda. The 
attaché to the U.S. Embassy in China, James Shepley, wrote a memorandum to Marshall on 
December 19th, summarizing the political situation in China. Shepley minced no words about 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Government, claiming that prior constitutions Chiang had 
proposed, “provided nothing more than what might charitably be called a constitutional 
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dictatorship” and even declared that, “on the face of it the moral right seemed to lie with the 
dissident elements.”62 Shepley employed the same vocabulary used by his peers, classifying the 
CCP in his “dissident elements”. Echoing the confident condescension Ambassador Hurley and 
Secretary Stevens’s early memos, Shepley described the CCP’s demand to receive Japanese 
troops’ surrender as, “bickering back and forth”.63 And yet, as U.S. discourse had established, the 
Mission had to stand by Chiang, because the Soviets could come to dominate North China 
should the CCP rise to power. Left unanswered was how a China led by a leader aspiring to 
“constitutional dictatorship” could possibly resist Soviet hegemony.  
Minimizing the postcolonial nationalism of Mao while pursuing great-power concerns 
vis-à-vis the Soviet Union resulted in a hubristic assumption that U.S. officials understood the 
problems of China better than the bickering Chinese themselves. This hubristic confidence bled 
through Shepley’s agenda for Marshall, which consisted of four points: the establishment of an 
interim government with Chiang at its head, the consequent surrender of the CCP’s 8th and 4th 
Route Armies, the interim government’s re-establishment of Chinese sovereignty, and the 
selection of political representatives to a national assembly which would formalize a unity 
government.64 The scope of the Mission was one of management, organization, and 
democratization, subsuming the breach in China’s social memory. Reflecting the degree of 
American misunderstanding of Mao, Shepley argued that the CCP’s surrender of its armies was, 
“certainly not too much to expect…if Chiang gives them a voice in a coalition government.”65 
This gratitude borne by a desperation for power was tenuous, with Zhu De already threatening 
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Mao based on the nationalism of his troops, and with Mao’s own history of connecting the 
CCP’s nationalist legitimacy and its war against Japan since 1937.  
 Upon his arrival in China, General Marshall held separate meetings with Chiang Kai-
Shek, CCP diplomat Zhou Enlai, and members of the Democratic League, a minor political 
faction. Throughout these meetings, U.S. officials refracted China’s divide through the Realist 
lens of the American experience in World War II, and through great-power understandings of 
strength. In his first meeting with Chiang, Marshall listened carefully as Chiang recounted the 
resistance encountered by Nationalists in reclaiming territory in North China. Chiang stated,   
On October 24th the Russians withdrew [from Yinkow and Hulutao] permitting the Chinese 
Communists to move into those two ports. Our attempts to land at Yinkow and Hulutao were 
opposed by Chinese Communists. We realized now that the Chinese Communists occupied those 
two ports by consent and assistance of the Russians.66 
 
The drivers of the CCP’s obstructionist strategy could be understood if Marshall had been aware 
of Mao’s vow to fight to the finish in defense of such ports, but by the time the Mission began, 
the CCP had already been reduced to the status of belligerents, of tools in Soviet maneuvering. 
Marshall demonstrated his relative ignorance of the situation, telling Chiang that, “This is the 
first time I have heard much of what the Generalissimo [Chiang Kai-Shek] has stated.”67 Despite 
this unfamiliarity, Marshall instantly reached for the comfort of America’s experience with the 
Soviets when Chiang asked for his advice on the situation in China. He stated,  
I am just learning many of these details for the first time. Mental processes of the Russians are 
different. Throughout the war we have had some difficulties with them. I must say however in 
justice to them that this was due to lack of faith on both sides. I found in my personal dealings 
with Stalin that he inspired me with confidence in contrast to his Foreign Office, however I felt 
this way in my contacts with the British Foreign Office. I dealt all right with the Prime Minister. 
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Our own State Department might be considered in a similar manner—they use mysterious 
language.68 
 
In short, Marshall reached for the familiarity of U.S.-Soviet relations, implicitly applying that 
framework to understand KMT-CCP conflict.  
 Marshall’s second meeting, with Zhou Enlai, demonstrated divergent impressions of the 
source of U.S. and CCP legitimacy. For Marshall, America’s legitimacy in China rested upon its 
status as a great-power and its newfound hegemony in the Pacific. Marshall asked Zhou to 
understand that while, “China was, of course, in the midst of a bitter struggle with an 
overwhelming enemy for a number of years, [he] doubted if even the Chinese people realized the 
extent of America’s effort in the Pacific war.”69 Marshall added that he doubted whether China 
was aware of, “…the tremendous American land, sea and air power in the Pacific which 
precipitated the end of the war. The American forces…had built up tremendous power in the 
Pacific … They brought the war to an end by generous expenditures of men, air power and sea 
power and atomic power…”70 For Marshall and the U.S. more broadly, the logic of American 
power in the Pacific allowed the U.S. to become involved in China’s conflict, enabling the U.S. 
to seek the “longer-range goals” that Secretary Byrnes had spoken of before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee. As a result, Marshall could claim that, “How the various groups reach 
accord in China is a Chinese affair, but the U. S. feels the accomplished fact is our affair.”71 
China fit into the broader context of regional American military power, making its peace an 
exercise in hegemony. In responding to Marshall, Zhou made clear the contrast between the 
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sources of U.S. and CCP legitimacy in China. Zhou stated that, “…the Chinese people had made 
great sacrifices during the war. He recalled that China had been in the war for eight years, and if 
you reckon from Mukden, for fourteen years. The losses were especially heavy in occupied 
areas.”72 Where Marshall emphasized a legitimacy conferred by theories of great-power 
hegemony, Zhou emphasized a legitimacy drawn from suffering. 
 In his third meeting, with the Democratic League, Marshall delved deeper into the points 
made with Zhou, reflecting a geostrategic perception of China which revolved around managing 
Asia as a project of hegemony. Marshall returned to his explanation of the source of American 
interests in China, stating that the U.S. had made, “a prodigious effort in the Pacific in the air and 
on the ground and on the sea, to destroy the power of the Japanese Government” in an attempt to, 
“to secure peace in the world and particularly in the Pacific.”73 As a result, “the primary purpose 
on the part of the U. S. Government is to secure that peace and see that it is not destroyed by war 
in Asia.”74 For the first time, Marshall connected peace in the Pacific Ocean with peace in Asia, 
with China acting as the connecting pivot state upon which prospects for peace rested. Marshall 
expanded on this implicit linkage, claiming that, “…in connection with the criticisms of the 
American troops in China…our primary purpose…has been peace in Asia” and that the U.S. 
government sought, “peace in the Pacific.”75 Marshall’s discourse reflected a geopolitical logic 
where China’s conflict was the fractal prism of U.S. hegemony, connecting U.S. postwar naval 
power with Asia’s continental and maritime security at large: peace in Asia depended on a 
balance of power with China at its center. His demonstration that Asia was interchangeable with 
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the Pacific expanded the scope of American power in China—if the U.S. could succeed in China, 
it could consolidate a favorable postwar balance of power. In this interpretation of China’s 
significance, Mao and Chiang were simply parts of a larger, Asian and Pacific whole; the 
specific ideologies animating their conflict were reduced to footnotes in the context of expanding 
American interests and power. 
 General Marshall erased any remaining distinctions between China’s divide and great-
power frameworks in a telegram sent to President Truman on December 29th, 1945. The 
telegram’s language applied America’s great-power perspective to Marshall’s relationship with 
Chiang, and by extension, the broader position of the Marshall Mission in China. Marshall built 
on his instant application of U.S.-Soviet relations to Chiang’s problem of reasserting Nationalist 
sovereignty. He told President Truman that in another meeting with Chiang on Christmas Day, “I 
think I brought him to realize that many of the embarrassments in Manchuria were not peculiar 
to that problem but common to Russian procedure everywhere, citing examples.”76 The issue of 
Manchuria, pregnant with meaning for Mao’s postcolonial nationalism and Chiang’s attempt to 
assert his authority, was subsumed by Russian procedure. Its importance lay in the wider pattern 
of Soviet operations “everywhere”. Marshall’s choice of words reflected the confident 
condescension of U.S. officials, reflective of their status as a great-power in the Pacific. His 
focus on “citing examples”, and “[bringing] Chiang to realize” the true importance of Manchuria 
was an attempt to avoid a, “posture of cracking the whip.”77  
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Marshall situated himself as the seat of logic and pragmatism in China, where, “the 
practical procedure to secure…ends…are almost completely lacking.”78 It was up to Marshall to 
bring himself to, “plainly and emphatically [indicate this] in my repeated questioning and blunt 
statements. I think I have made this point glaringly clear to all and they now appear to be 
struggling towards a more realistic point of view.”79 In this management of the Chinese, 
Marshall’s language mirrored the power dynamic of his explanation of America’s interest in a 
geopolitical, region-wide balance of power: the Mission’s pragmatism allowed it to guide the 
Chinese, flowing from America’s embrace of its strategic position in the region. The Realism of 
the Truman Administration, articulated before the Marshall Mission began, had constructed a 
discursive worldview emphasizing the scope of American power, thereby leaving the nuance of 
China’s conflict out of its discourse. 
January-February 1946: The Glide Path to Confrontation 
 One of the first items on the Mission’s agenda was the implementation of a country-wide 
ceasefire. In these negotiations, the impact of Realist discourses made itself felt, placing the U.S. 
and the CCP on the glide path to confrontation because of looming fears of great-power 
competition with the Soviet Union. Kennan and Harriman’s cables had led officials to believe 
that the CCP was a Russian proxy, key to achieving Soviet hegemony over China. The cease-fire 
negotiations, combined with Kennan’s resuscitation of Soviet fears, led the U.S. to tie itself to 
Nationalist sovereignty in Manchuria as part of a territorial deterrent to Soviet expansion. 
 Marshall’s focus on Russian actions in Manchuria, rendered his mission’s 
 
78 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, The Far East, China, Volume VII, eds. David M. Baehler, Herbert 
A. Fine, Ralph R. Goodwin, N. Stephen Kane, Ronald D. Landa, Lisle A. Rose, William F. Sanford, Jr., and Ilana 




recommendations inseparable from broader geopolitical concerns. On January 1st, in their first 
Cessation of Hostilities Plan, U.S. officials working with Marshall called for, “the cessation of 
troop movements within China except those Nationalist Forces destined for Manchuria…for the 
purpose of re-establishing Chinese sovereignty.”80 Two days later, Chargé Robertson relayed a 
message from Marshall to Secretary Byrnes, in Washington, requesting his, “personal estimate of 
the Soviet intent in Manchuria and relations between Russia and the Chinese Communists” and, 
“whether the difficulties the Generalissimo reports in his relations with Russia in Manchuria are 
not mostly of the same pattern as our own similar difficulties in Europe,”.81 That same day, in a 
meeting with CCP diplomat Zhou Enlai, Marshall stated, “The U.S. Government is committed to 
the movement of troops into Manchuria.”82 Against the backdrop of American concerns about 
Soviet expansion into Manchuria, this commitment took on a strategic meaning. By turning 
Manchuria into a potential staging ground for great-power tensions, the Mission placed it in a 
framework of competition which occluded Chinese nationalism. Mao’s distinctions between the 
great-powers, which depended upon their reaction to “Manchukuo” and Japanese aggression, 
was not analyzed. As a result, Marshall committed the Truman Administration to backing 
Chiang Kai-Shek’s efforts to re-establish sovereignty in Manchuria, which would eventually face 
CCP blowback. 
 This discursive gap became formalized in the fifth rounds of cease-fire negotiations. 
Marshall met with Nationalist representative Governor Chang Chun, and CCP diplomat Zhou 
Enlai to review the wording of the cease-fire agreement. Marshall read out, “Paragraph b, 
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cessation of hostilities order does not prejudice military movements south of the Yangtze River 
for the continued execution of the plan of military reorganization of the National Government,” 
and that, “…cessation of hostilities order does not prejudice military movements of forces of the 
National Army into or within Manchuria or toward ports in China for embarkation for Manchuria 
which are for the purpose of restoring Chinese sovereignty.”83 Zhou Enlai had already expressed 
CCP concerns over Nationalist force movement into Chifeng and Tolun, located in Northern 
China.84 The final statement referred broadly to Manchuria as a result, but left the issue of 
competing CCP and KMT claims in Manchuria for later negotiations. Nonetheless, the cease-fire 
became an opportunity to consolidate the Nationalist position in China, allowing it to pursue 
“military reorganization” and move into Manchuria.  
 U.S. suspicions of Russian intentions would be confirmed by George F. Kennan the next 
day, whose telegram represented a paradigm shift in the U.S. government’s perspective on China 
and great-power competition with the Soviet Union. Weeks before his Long Telegram, he 
explicitly applied the lens of geopolitical realism to China. Kennan claimed that, “USSR seeks 
predominant influence in China” because, “by revolutionary tradition, by nationalist ambition 
and by kinetic nature, Russia [is an] expansionist force.”85 Describing their “kinetic nature”, 
Kennan argued that the Soviets were, “strategically obsessed with concept of national defense in 
great depth” and were, “incredulous that there can exist between nations any satisfactory 
permanent relationship not based on the recognized ascendancy of one to the other”.86 As a 
result, the Soviets preferred, “…coalition to division of China because latter would probably 
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mean definite restriction of Communist influence to a closely defined area in Northern China, 
leaving Moscow without direct contact with vast Southeast Asian colonial area.”87 Even though 
Kennan hesitated to brand the CCP as an appendage of Moscow, he stated, “We are quite 
prepared to believe that Chinese CP like other CP’s is subservient to Moscow. This would be 
normal state of affairs with respect to any foreign Communist party of which Moscow publicly 
approved.88 Kennan organized China along the gradients of Soviet strategic depth; in the eyes of 
U.S. officials, it became the terrain upon which Soviet designs played out. By stating that the 
U.S.S.R. preferred a coalition government, Kennan implicitly argued for the elimination of the 
CCP. If they were “subservient” to Moscow, then accepting them into the coalitional government 
would enable Soviet “expansionist” tendencies, thereby threatening U.S. interests.  
 The impact of Kennan’s analysis reverberated through U.S. discourse in February, 
placing a renewed impetus on re-establishing Chiang Kai-Shek’s sovereignty in Manchuria. 
Operating from Kennan’s Realist framework of great-power competition and geopolitical 
expansion, American officials ignored the CCP’s nationalist warnings about peace in China. 
Zhou Enlai sent Marshall three memos detailing cease-fire violations in late January, asking him 
to see, “the true light of the field situation”.89 Zhou’s reports described violations of the CCP’s 
right to accept the surrender of remaining Japanese troops in China. He claimed, “the Nationalist 
forces…have either upon their own initiative received surrender of those Japanese forces, which 
are surrounded by the Communist-led troops and by right should have surrendered to the 
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latter,”.90 Zhou demonstrated the CCP’s continued, nationalist connection “by right” between 
accepting Japanese surrender and gaining legitimacy.  
However, Marshall’s own perspective had shifted towards Kennan’s. Writing to President 
Truman in February, he described his conversation with Chiang Kai-Shek’s Foreign Minister, 
Dr. Wang Shih Chieh about re-establishing KMT control of Manchuria. Marshall stated that 
China possessed a, “…vulnerability to Soviet undercover attack, which exists so long as there 
remains a separate Communist Government and a separate Communist Army in China.”91 While 
Marshall was conveying his belief in the security provided by unification, the connection 
between China’s “vulnerability” and the CCP proved telling; Marshall subtly echoed Kennan’s 
argument that the CCP was incompatible with China’s future. In this light, America’s 
unconditional support for Chiang Kai-Shek to move into Manchuria became a means to the end 
of preventing Soviet expansion. The question, however, was how the emotion-laden nationalism 
of the CCP could be reconciled with the Nationalist attempt to move into Manchuria. As Zhou 
Enlai’s memos demonstrated, not even a national cease-fire could hold. 
 By the end of February, Marshall decided to leave China to discuss the Mission’s 
progress and future with President Truman, in Washington. His staff, however, re-emphasized 
the great-power frameworks shaping the Mission’s trajectory. Already in Washington, James 
Shepley, the Attaché to the U.S. Embassy in China, wrote Marshall that he had, “…outlined 
briefly the situation as you found it and how you proceeded to get your results.”92 Shepley spoke 
for the Mission when he told President Truman that, “The entire emphasis is on the critical 
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necessity of a long-range American program in China, to be directed by a top flight man in the 
post of Ambassador.”93 The U.S. program’s “critical necessity” was the result of the Soviets’ 
obsession with hegemony over China. Shepley demonstrated the persistence of American 
condescension by infantilizing Chiang and Mao. He stated, “I have explained how difficult it is 
for the Chinese to understand the technique of implementation and how you have been hand 
feeding this technique.”94 In a callback to Byrnes’s “longer-range” goal, Shepley’s call for a 
“long-range” program represented the culmination of the Mission’s discourse: it at once captured 
the relationship between American power in the Pacific and China’s role in a regional balance of 
power, while demonstrating that U.S. officials took their hegemony to heart, projecting it onto 
their relations with the Chinese.  
 The day after Shepley’s memo, the problems embedded in the Mission’s discourse and 
broader U.S. discourse on China came to the fore. The CCP issued a press release on the 
situation in Manchuria, “…accepted in many quarters as evidence of Chinese Communist-Soviet 
collusion in Manchuria.”95 The statement’s importance lay in its demonstration of the 
postcolonial nationalism the CCP associated with Manchuria, where new violence, “…would be 
a blow to the longing for peace and democracy of the Manchurian people who have been 
trampled for fourteen years and the longing of the entire nation for peaceful settlement of the 
Manchurian question.”96 This nationalist claim built on Mao’s ideology, with the CCP speaking 
for the “trampled” in pursuit of peace. Problematically, the statement was interpreted in the 
context of Soviet-CCP relations; the CCP’s zealotry, let alone their nationalism, had already 
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been surgically cut out of American policy discourse. The press release foreshadowed the 
coming disintegration of the Marshall Mission, in the Manchurian Crisis (April-May 1946).  
The Manchurian Crisis (April-May 1946): The Mission’s Collapse 
 The Marshall Mission would officially end on January 8th, 1947. However, its ambitions 
narrowed significantly after the Manchurian Crisis, with Marshall’s agenda turning into a series 
of re-negotiated cease-fires and attempts to stop the spread of violence into southern China. 
Functionally, the Mission collapsed on May 4, 1946 because of swelling nationalism, a factor 
thus far omitted entirely from American discourse and policy debates.   
 The Soviet Union withdrew its remaining forces in Northern China on May 3, 1946, 
leaving Manchuria open to KMT and CCP forces. In the weeks leading up to Soviet drawdown, 
Mao and Chiang both embraced the symbolism of May 4th in Chinese history, whipping up 
nationalist sentiment and preparing to fight for control over Manchuria. The May 4th Movement 
of 1919 refers to the, “beginning of China's modern revolutionary era”, building upon the 
Republican Revolution of 1911.97 Student-led demonstrations protested, “…the terms of the 
Versailles Peace Treaty as they affected China, and…the terms of Japan's infamous 'Twenty-one 
Demands'…” across the country, making it a nationalist, postcolonial moment in China’s 
history.98 As demonstrated, U.S. discourse was unable to engage postcolonial nationalism in the 
CCP’s ideology—the May 4th Movement was certainly outside its major-power discursive 
parameters.  
 In this moment, the frictions between Chiang and Mao hardened, precipitating violence in 
Manchuria. Chiang decided to move his headquarters from Chongqing to Nanjing, in time to 
 




commemorate the May 4th Movement and Chinese history. Apart from its history as a site of 
imperial humiliation in Chinese memory—the First Opium War ended because of the unequal 
Treaty of Nanjing in 1842, and the Rape of Nanjing in 1937 marked war crimes committed by 
Imperial Japan— Nanjing also housed the mausoleum for Sun Yat-Sen, a key intellectual in the 
Revolution of 1911.99 On May 5th, 1946, Chiang celebrated the KMT’s return to Nanjing by 
paying public tribute to the mausoleum, bowing to an orchestra of 101 guns.100  
 Emboldened by this symbolism, fighting erupted across North China, concentrated in 
Siping. Mao’s CCP recalled their willingness to make total sacrifice against Japan, embracing 
the slogan, “Do not fear blood or sacrifice.”101 Zhou Enlai wrote Marshall that, “With the entry 
of these forces into Manchuria, not only the offensive of Government troops in that area will be 
intensified, but there is an increasing danger of having the war spread to China proper.”102 
Marshall himself acknowledged the gravity of the situation, cabling President Truman about the 
new dimensions of China’s conflict. He analyzed the crystallization of hard-line nationalism, 
noting that CCP leaders fighting in Changchun were “jubilant over seizing the place”, while 
“The Generalissimo’s political advisors or backers, and I think his military leaders also, urge a 
policy of force”.103 The remainder of the Marshall Mission would deal with preventing violence 
from spreading into “China proper”, by organizing individual cease-fires as local attacks 
mounted. Marshall realized that the ambitions he laid out in meetings with Chiang, Zhou, and the 
Democratic League were fading, telling President Truman that “The outlook is not promising… I 
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am in the midst of the problem. At this moment I submit no recommendations.”104 The Mission’s 
discourse, rooted in the language of great-powers, Realism, and geopolitics, had left U.S. 
officials blindsided by the nationalist dimension of China’s divide.  
Conclusion: Getting China Wrong in the 21st Century 
This paper argues that the Truman Administration’s Realist policy discourse led to its 
inability to grasp Mao Zedong’s postcolonial nationalism, leading to the Marshall Mission’s 
failure. However, the Mission acts as a case study in its demonstration of the tension that exists 
between Realist expectations of international politics and nationalist movements. Hans 
Morgenthau (2005, p.35), claimed that states are the basic unit of world politics, and that, “The 
aspiration for power being the distinguishing element of international politics…international 
politics is of necessity power politics.” By its nature, Realism is the discourse of great-powers. 
Mao Zedong’s nationalism could not be captured by it. Realism made itself felt in Ambassador 
Harriman and Secretary Stevens’s telegrams to Washington before the U.S. Policy on China was 
published. It cast a shadow over Ambassador Harriman’s and George F. Kennan’s campaign to 
connect China with U.S.-Soviet competition. And in the Truman Administration’s upper-level 
deliberations in December of 1945, Secretary of State Byrnes and General Marshall each 
articulated the Realist expectation that the Soviets would occupy Manchuria to maximize their 
hegemony. During the Mission, Marshall and his staff gave voice to the strategic perspective of 
America in the Asia-Pacific, situating China as the fulcrum of a balance of power in continental 
and maritime Asia. With Kennan’s description of the Soviets’ “kinetic nature” in January of 
1946, the Mission’s objectives in Manchuria took on a geostrategic urgency in the context of 
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power politics. The failure of these whole-of-government Realist assumptions suggests a broader 
question for international relations theory: is the discourse of Realism equipped to engage with 
nationalist movements and ideologies? In the 21st century, U.S.-China relations hinge on the 
answer to this question.  
General Marshall left China on January 8th, 1947. The Marshall Mission’s disintegration 
was caused by the latent tensions between the Truman Administration’s Realist China policy and 
Mao Zedong’s postcolonial nationalism; violence spread across the country in the ensuing 
months, and the Mission became a series of cease-fire negotiations, until its total collapse after 
Chiang Kai-Shek began preparations in the winter of 1946 for a final military offensive.105 The 
rapid evolution of its Realist, geopolitical discourse, however, carries significant implications for 
U.S.-China relations in the 21st century. The discourse limited the ability of the U.S. government 
to truly grasp the animating force of the CCP, and the power of nationalist sentiment in China, 
demonstrating the danger of solely relying on Realist prisms to craft policy towards 
fundamentally nationalist movements. President Xi Jinping draws from the wellspring of 
postcolonial nationalism established by Mao Zedong to frame Chinese competition with the 
United States. The Biden Administration’s implicit use of Realist logic, however, overlooks the 
significance of Xi’s nationalism, threatening confrontation between the U.S. and Xi’s CCP. 
 Xi’s nationalism continues Mao’s emphasis on the Chinese people, but frames U.S.-
China relations in three dimensions: Chinese history, Asia-Pacific security, and Chinese 
domestic politics. The historian Rana Mitter (2020) has observed that resistance to aggression 
forms a rare source of domestic consensus in China’s 20th century history, and therefore in the 
history of the CCP, suggesting that Xi may rely on nationalist appeals to in order to solidify his 
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power. At the Chinese Communist Party Congress, in October of 2017, the CCP enshrined “Xi 
Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for the New Era” into the party 
constitution, making Xi the most powerful Chinese leader since Mao Zedong and grounding the 
constitution in a newfound sense of Chinese nationalism.106 October 19th, 2020 marked the 70th 
anniversary of China’s entry into the Korean War. For the first time, China used the opportunity 
to reconstruct its historical role. Cognizant of current U.S.-China tensions, President Xi hailed 
his country’s “victory in the war to resist American aggression and aid Korea” while releasing a 
trove of propaganda videos celebrating Chinese volunteer efforts during the war.107 According to 
Xi, “Seventy years ago, imperialist invaders brought the flames of war burning to the doorway of 
the new China…The Chinese people [understand] that in responding to invaders, one must speak 
to them in a language that they understand.”108 For Xi, Chinese nationalism must re-cast China’s 
history to prepare for competition with the United States. 
Xi also adopts nationalist rhetoric to invoke Asia’s security, echoing Mao’s embrace of a 
postcolonial Asia. Before China’s most recent National People’s Congress, Xi claimed, “the East 
is rising, and the West is declining”, while cautioning that, “the West is [still] strong and the East 
is weak.”109 In the context of his claims that, “The biggest source of chaos in the present-day 
world is the United States,” Xi appears to be juxtaposing the U.S. against the security of the 
“East”, guarded by China.110 At the National People’s Congress, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang 
bolstered Xi’s nationalism by applying it to China’s domestic recovery from COVID-19, 
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claiming that, “Our people worked hard and fought adversity in close solidarity and with the 
unyielding spirit of the Chinese nation, thus proving themselves true heroes…This is the well of 
strength that enables us to rise to every challenge and overcome every difficulty.”111 With these 
statements coming days before President Biden convened a meeting of the Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue—composed of India, Japan, Australia, and the U.S.—to discuss China’s rise and a 
regional response to COVID-19 in the Indo-Pacific, U.S. policy approaches towards China merit 
closer examination.  
The Biden Administration’s resuscitation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the 
Quad) places the U.S. and China on the path to further confrontation by using the logic of great-
power Realism to craft policy towards Xi Jinping’s fundamentally nationalist CCP. After 
meeting with the Quad, Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd 
Austin embarked on trips to Japan and South Korea, before Secretary Blinken led a meeting with 
Chinese officials in Anchorage, Alaska.112 Bolstering U.S. alliances with Tokyo and Seoul to 
confront, “the biggest geopolitical test of the 21st century”, American officials sought to generate 
multilateral partnerships capable of deterring China’s maritime expansion in the South and East 
China Seas, in pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific.113 The underlying assumption of this 
strategy is that Xi’s China obeys Realist, cost-based logic, whereby Xi’s ambitions would be 
affected by multilateral security postures—a Realist theory of deterrence in all but name.  
The historic geography of these alliances, however, illustrates that they will inflame 
rather than blunt Xi’s impression of U.S. aggression, by ideologically threatening Mao’s theory 
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of security in a postcolonial Asia. As General Marshall embarked on his Mission, the partition of 
the Korean Peninsula had just begun, and U.S. forces were consolidating their naval basing in 
Okinawa and Guam. And by the time Mao established the People’s Republic of China in 1949, 
Chiang Kai-Shek had fled to Taiwan. Mao’s vision for Korea, Japan, and a consolidated Chinese 
mainland free from a rival hegemon in the Western Pacific never came to fruition because of 
America’s postwar position as the chief naval power of the Asia-Pacific region.  
The Biden Administration’s pursuit of a free and open Indo-Pacific is arranged around 
this historic geography, with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue framed relative to China’s 
regional maritime expansion. In 2012, Naval War College Professor Toshi Yoshihara analyzed 
the island chains created by such history, with the First Island Chain consisting of Japan, the 
Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Philippines, and the Second Island Chain centering on Guam.114  
Yoshihara analyzed this geography through the lens of maritime geostrategy, arguing that 
China’s strategists feared strategic encirclement through the framework of geopolitical realism, 
as articulated by Sir Halford Mackinder, Nicholas J. Spykman, and Alfred Thayer Mahan.115  
Viewed historically, however, the island chains represent the long shadow of the 1945-
1949 years; for China to accept this map would be to accept what the CCP believes is a 
revisionist theory of Asian security, relative to the CCP’s founding nationalist creed. In his first 
address to a joint session of Congress, President Biden stated that he told Xi in a phone call that, 
“we’ll maintain a strong military presence in the Indo-Pacific, just as we do with NATO in 
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Europe — not to start a conflict, but to prevent one.”116 By implicitly re-emphasizing island 
chain strategies through great-power dialectics in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, the Biden 
Administration seeks to apply the deterrent logic of geopolitical realism, but is overlooking the 
deep-seated, historic drivers of Xi’s nationalism. President Xi Jinping’s recent statements 
demonstrate that he shares Mao Zedong’s belief that, “The people, and the people alone, are the 
motive force in the making of world history.”117 In this sense, the Marshall Mission’s 
demonstration of how Realist discourses interact with nationalist movements proves relevant to 
U.S.-China relations in the 21st century, while outlining an initial question for further study: can 
U.S. foreign policy in Asia transcend the limitations of Realist discourse, in its second encounter 
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